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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 13-2170 
 
HECTOR TAVAREZ, 
 
                       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE TOWNSHIP OF EGG HARBOR;  
JAMES J. MCCULLOUGH;  
STANLEY GLASSEY;  
PAUL HODSON;  
JOHN W. RISLEY, JR.;  
JOHN CARMAN, JR.; 
JOHN DOE (1-10)  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Civ. No. 1-09-cv-06119) 
District Judge: Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 19, 2014 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 16, 2014) 
 
OPINION 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Hector Tavarez appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
Township of Egg Harbor and individual members of the Township Committee 
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(hereinafter “Egg Harbor”) on the racial discrimination claim asserted against Egg 
Harbor.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Inasmuch as the district court has set forth the factual and procedural history of 
this case, it is not necessary to repeat that complete history here.  Tavarez v. Township of 
Egg Harbor, 2013 WL 1288164 (D.N.J. March 25, 2013).  Accordingly, we will recite 
only as much of the facts and procedural history as are helpful for our brief discussion.  
 In a “nutshell,” Tavarez alleges that Egg Harbor’s failure to promote him to 
Captain of Police in 2007, 2008, and 2009, constituted racial discrimination.
1
 Summary 
judgment motions in § 1981 actions are governed by the burden shifting  analysis 
established in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), that are 
generally applied in Title VII cases.  See Chauhan v. M. Alfieri Co., 897 F.2d 123, 126 
(3d Cir. 1990); Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2009).   Under that 
burden-shifting analysis, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie 
case of unlawful discrimination.  If the plaintiff meets that burden, the burden of 
production shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the employee’s rejection.  If the defendant answers the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case with legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its decision, the burden rebounds to 
the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s explanation 
is pretextual.   
                                              
1
 We note that Tavarez was promoted to Captain in 2011, prior to his retirement from the 
Police Department.   
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 In the district court, Egg Harbor conceded that Tavarez had established a prima 
facie case of racial discrimination for failure to promote based on race for the 2007, 2008 
and 2009 promotions at issue.  Specifically, Egg Harbor agreed the Tavarez is a member 
of a protected class – a Hispanic male; that he was qualified for the position of Captain in 
each year but did not receive the promotion; and that a Caucasian male was promoted to 
Captain in each year.  As a result of these concessions, the issues before the district court 
were whether Egg Harbor presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not 
promoting Tavarez in the years at issue and whether Tavarez produced any evidence to 
show that Egg Harbor’s proffered reasons for not promoting him were pretextual.   
 In its opinion, the district court carefully and fully explained its reasons for finding 
that Egg Harbor offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting 
Tavarez in 2007, 2008 and 2009, and for finding that Tavarez failed to demonstrate that 
Egg Harbor’s proffered legitimate reasons were pretexts for discrimination.  2013 WL 
1288164 at *4-10.   We are in complete agreement with the district court’s thoughtful 
analysis, and the record supports the court’s findings.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
district court substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court’s opinion without 
further elaboration. 
 
 
 
